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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAW*
I

Arthur M. Smith t

I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS

T

HE framers of the Federal Constitution shared with Thomas Jefferson his "wish to see new inventions encouraged, and old ones
brought again info useful notice." 1 Their concern for the public welfare caused many, including Jefferson, to question the wisdom of using
a limited monopoly to encourage such inventions. ·
After years of close association with the administration of the early
patent statutes, Jefferson wrote:
"Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not of
p.atural right, but for the benefit of society, I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which
are not." 2

A survey of the recent developments in patent law shows that those
charged with its present administration face the same difficulty. The

* This article appears as part of the series on recent developments in the various
fields of the law published and to be published by the REVIEW as a service for returning veterans. See announcement, 44 MicH. L. REv. 149 (1945).
Previously published: Tracy, Evidence, 44 MICH. L. REV. 448 (1945); Waite,
Criminal Law, 44 MICH. L. REv. 631 (1946); Stason, Administrative Law, 44
MICH. L. REV. 797 (1946); Simes, TNf!ts and Estates, 44 MICH. L. REV. 833
(1946).
Appearing also in this issue: Bradway, Domestic Relations, p. 1052; Russell A.
Smith, Labor Law, p. 1089.
To be published: Shartel, Constitutional Law; James, Corporation Law; Ohlinger,
Federal Jurisdiction and Practice; Winters, State Adoption of the Federal Rules;
Thurston, Restitution; Kauper, Taxation; Leidy,• Torts; Oppenheim, Trade Regulotiom.
t1 Member of Michigan Bar.
Letter to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, as published in PADoVER, THE CoMPLETE JEFFERSON lOII (1943).
2
Id. 1016.
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func;lamental conflict between a free economy and the grant of limited
monopolies to small groups in such an economy has not been resolved.
Recognition of this fundamental conflict underlies most of the recent
developments in patent law.
It will be recalled that, prior to the adoption of the Constitution,
the experiences of the individual colonists with the "monopolies" exercised under_ either royal or colonial grants had not been satisfactory.
These "monopolies" had been used effectively to curtail industrial development in the Colonies. Under these monopolies the mass of the
colonists had been exploited economically for the benefit of the relatively few holders of the monopolies. The generally held view of the
colonists was that all monopolies were "odius."
When, therefore, the decision was reached that Congress should
have the power to "reward". the cl~ss of "authors and inventors" by
giving them the exclusive right in their "inventions and discoveries"
for a limited time, it is understandable that this "exclusive right"
should have been surrounded by, both legislative and judicial safeguards designed to prevent abuses of this privilege.
A patent under the first patent act 8 required the filing of a petition
addressed to the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the
Secretary of War. The patent itself required the signature of the
President and was granted only if at least two of the three officials
joined in recommending its issuance. The "standard of invention"
set by Thomas Je:fferson, Edmund Randolph, and Henry Knox in
issuing patents under the first patent act was high indeed and relatively
,
few patents were granted.
When subjected to judicial scrutiny, many of these first patents were
found to be void for some of the same reasons we find stated in
recent decisions fo~ invalidating modern pa~ents. In fact, one of the
most significant developments in recent patent law decisions in the
United States Supreme Court may be said to be its "recurrence to
fundamentals" found in the earlier patent _decisions of the Court.¼
8

Act of April IO, l 790, 1 Stat. L. 109.
A review of the early patent cases in the United States Supreme Court shows
a strong judicial distrust of the patent system. An analysis of patent litigation in the
Supreme Court during the period from 1810 to 1854 (U.S. Vols. 1-57) shows that
fourteen cases are reported in which the validity of a patent was directly in issue. In
two of these cases, the Court presumed validity of the patents in the absence of a.
jury finding of fraud in the procurement of the patents. In nine cases, the patents
were found valid and in three cases, the patents were held void. When it is recalled
that many of these patents had issued only after the recommendation of men of cabinet
rank, this is a relatively high mortality rate. The reasons assigned for finding invalidity, in these early cases, leads one to observe that the so-called "anti-patent" phi¼
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The experiences of the individual citizens under the early patent
laws were found to be generally satisfactory. By I 890, new factories
had developed, which under the protection of a "patent," produced
tlie ma!\Y things required for the creature comfort of the people and
for providing the machines required to ·pace the rapid expansion and
growth of the nation. This change in the public attitude resulted in
changes which in general liberalized the patent laws and caused the
issuance of patents in large numbers. 5
By 1890, the public attitude toward patentees had changed and the
patentee is not viewed with distrust as the creator of a potential public
menace. Instead he is considered to be a public benefactor, the en,
couragement of whose efforts becomes a "duty" of the State.6
As the public attitude toward patent monopolies changed 1 we find
that legislative changes liberalized the patent laws until the granting of
patents became an accepted and rountine function of a governmental
bureau. Currently the mechanical patents issued under the present
patent system are nearing the two and one half .million mark while
nearly one hundred fifty thousand design patents have been issued.
losophy of the present Supreme Court may be but a reflection of the historical attitude
of that Court toward the patents which have come before it.
15 Former Patent Commissioner Conway P. Coe, in a statement presented to the
Temporary National Economic Committee on January 16, 1939, has pointed out
that in 1840, approximately .25 patents issued per 10,000 residents and that this ratio
increased progressively until by 1890 it stood at approximately 3.25 patents per
10,000 residents. The high point of approximately 3.75 patents per 10,000 residents
was reached in 1910 and again in 1930.
6
"The duty which the state owes to the people to obtain for them, at the earliest
moment, the practical use of every valuable invention in the industrial arts is, however,
a higher and more imperative duty than any which it owes to the inventor. Upon
the amelioration of their physical condition depends, to a great extent, the mental
and moral progress of its citizens, and the influence of inventions in effecting this
amelioration cannot well be overestimated. Such a delay in bringing a single invention
into use as might result from an attempt by the inventor to conceal it may deprive
an entire generation of advantages which would redound to its incalculable benefit.
To secure the publication of the invention as soon as it is brought to such perfection
as to be capable of practical employment, and to remove, as early as the accomplishment
of this first object will permit, all restrictions to its free use by the people is therefore,
the main purpose of every concession made to the inventor by the state." 1 ROBINSON
ON PATENTS 57 (1890).
1 A patent, says Robinson, has a threefold nature; "As a reward bestowed on the
inventor for his past inventions, it is an act of justice. As an inducement to future
efforts, it is an act of sound public policy. As a grant of temporary protection in the
exclusive use of a particular invention, on condition of its immediate publication and
eventual surrender to the people, it is an act of compromise between the inventor and
the public, wherein each concedes something to the other in return for that which is
conceded to itself." Id. 58.
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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

II
RECENT CRITICISMS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM

It was inevitable that there would be a conflict between such a large
number of private "monopolies" and an economy geared to freedom of
production. The restraint on free production exercised by the holders
of the large number of unexpired patents came under particular. scrutiny when production generally was curtailed following the economic
crisis'of r929. Such factors have caused the public to become critical
of the patent laws, and have led to insistent demands for reform of the
patent system. These demands found support in the disclosures of certain restrictive trade agreements which, ostensibly as a part of patent
licensing. agreements, had the effect of curtailing production in items
ess.ential to war production. The demands for reform of the patent
laws have been accelerated by the expose of such agreements and the
publication of numerous articles 8 in which it was assumed that ·a11
patents were "odius" monopolies and that all trade agreements in
which restrictive patent licenses were a part had been entered into with
some ulterior motive ascribed 'to "Big Business," "International Cartels". or similar instrumentalities.
As public opinion was aroused by the abuses sometimes attributed
to the .patent laws, the case for and against the patent system was ably
stated by numerous authors.11
Studies of the patent laws and the entire patent system have been
undertaken both. by governmentaf groups and by groups representing
private organizations. Of the reports made by such groups, probably
~one has been as significant in. its effect on the trend of judicial decisions ~n patent cases as has been Monograph No. 3r, Patents and Free
Enterprise prepared for the use of the Temporary National Economic
8
rhurman W,. Arnold has been particularly critical of the patent laws in his
books THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM and THE BOTTLENECKS OF BusrnEss-and in
his articles, "Abuse of Patents," 170 THE ATLANTIC MoNTHLY 14 (July, 1942);
"We Depend on Invention," id. 21; "We Must Reform the Patent Law," id. 47
(Sept., 1942). Lawrence Langner's capably presented views contra to those expressed
by Thurman Arnold, also appear in the same issues. REIMANN, PATENTS FOR HITLER
(1942) also found a wide reader ~nterest.
9 A partial list of significant recent articles in lay magazines includes the following:
_
"Patents-Monopoly's Darlings," KEN MAGAZINE 75 (February 9, 1939).
Stockbridge, "That Idea's Worth Millions," 2II THE SATURDAY EVENING PosT
IO (April 8, 1939).
,
Frank, "What's Wrong with Our Patent System," 215 THE SATURDAY EVENING PosT 20 (November 28, 1942).
Fleming, "Holding Hands with Hitler," 30 NATION'S BusINESS 17 (June, 1942).
Mayne, "Patents Today,." CHEMICAL ENGINEERING NEWS (March 10, 1943).
Hackley, "Invention is Vital," 170 ATLANTIC MoNTHLY 49 (October, 1942).
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Committee in its investigation of the concentration of economic power.
This monograph, written by Professor Walton Hamilton, of Yale
Law School, was published in I 941. Since its publication, this monograph lias been referred to by the United States Supreme Court in
several opinions.10
After reviewing the numerous questions inherent in ascertaining
' the e:ffect of our patent system on our economy of free enterprise, this
monograph outlines 11 w]:iat must now be recognized as the current
trend in the judicial philos0phy of patents. Under this philosophy,
the ideal patent system must:
I. Create incentive to the promotipn of the industrial arts with the
least hazard to the system of free enterprise.
2. Accord recognition to private rights in technical discovery, yet
forbid personal trespass upon the useful knowledge which is co~on
property.
3. Make sure that the urge to patent is strong enough to serve its
, creative purpose, but is not allowed to overreach itself, and that innovations, after their apprenticeship under private auspices, shall promptly become a part of the public domain.
4. Prevent an entire monopoly of an industrial art and assure that
private claims do not obstruct the "stream of technical progress."

III
GENERAL TRENDS

The trend of recent judicial decisions indicates a continuing examination by the courts into the fundamental concepts of our patent system and a conscious striving to enforce the foregoing precepts of the
ideal patent system.
The economic-judicial-patent philosophy: expressed in the opinions,
both of the majority and of the dissenting minority, of the Justices of
the United States Supreme Court is the best available guide for both
the trial and appellate courts dealing with 'patent cases. The current
philosophies of all the courts dealing with patent cases cannot be
treated adequately in the present article. Hence, ,in order to arrive at
some conclusions as to the current trends in patent law, a review of
the more significant recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court has been made. This review indicates the following significant
trends in the current development of the patent law.
1

°

Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Aiµomatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 62 S. Ct.
37 (1941); Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 316 U.S. 364 at
381 (dissenting opinion), 62 S. Ct. 1179 (1942); Special Equipment v. Coe, 324 U.S.
370, 65 S. Ct. 741 (1945).
11
HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE, l'y.fonograph 31, Temporary
Natl. Economic Comm., p. 169 (1941).
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A large percentage of patents have been held invalid when
litigated.12 This indicates either that the administrative action of the
patent office in granting such a large proportion of invalid patents
needs correcting or that the current attitude of the Court is not sympathetic _to monopolistic governmental grants as rewards to patentees.
2. The public interest in the patent law has been placed in a position
to be at all times paramount to the interests of the private litigants.
3'. The patent law is recognized as but a part of the broader field
of the general law under which a patent owner is required to respect
the fundamental maxims of equity.
As a result of these trends, a large percentage of the litigated pat- ents have been held to be either invalid or non-enforceable either for
'
lack of infringement or for lack of equity in the patent owner.
- The popular appraisal of-this trend of the decisions in the United
States Supreme· Court is that the current philosophy of the Court is
"anti-patent." From a study of the recent patent case§ in this Court,
it is believed that a more satisfactory legal explanation for the high
percentage of patents, held invalid is to be found in the uncertain character of the "invention" in issue. Also, the constantly increasing numbers of expired patents which have become available to industry furnish a constantly broadening base for the successful defense against
later issued "improvement" patents. The decisions highlight the need
for bringing the "standard of invention" applied by the patent office
into line with the "standard of invention" applied by the courts.
One result of the popular appraisal of the critical attitude of the
Courts toward patents has been a sharp decline during the period
from 1930 to 1943, both in the number of patent applications filed and
in the number of patents issued. 18
The decline' since 1930 in both applications filed and in patents
I.

12
A tabulation of the patent decisions in the United States Supreme Court for
the period from 1930 to 1944 inclusive reveals these significant figures:
Total number of patents in suits decided
52
Total number of patents found valid and infringed -.
3
Total number of patents found not infringed
5
Total number of patents found invalid •
37
Total number of patents in which relief was denied on
equitable grounds •
7
13
A tabulation made from the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Patents
give the following figures ( corrected by the author to the nearest even 1000) :
1930
1943
Patent Applications filed .
92,000
45,000
Patents issued
49,000
32,000
Ratio of Patents per 10,000 population .
3.75
2.2
It is significant also-that comparable declines are noted in the number of applications filed and patents issued in most foreign countries.
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issued cannot be attributed satisfactorily to a lack of scientific and technical advances during the period. The current popular distrust of the
patent system, engendered by the trend of the decisions in the courts is
believed to be a more plausible explanation for it.14

IV
CuRRENT ACTIVITIES FOR THE STUDY AND PossIBLE REFORM
OF THE PATENT LAWS

Regardless of the underlying causes, the fact of such a decline both
in the number of applications filed and in the number of patents issued
indicates a ma.l-functioning of the patent system.15
To all serious students of the patent system these facts present a
challenge to consider whether or not there should be change or reform
in the fundamental concept of the patent law that a governmentally
granted monopoly is an incentive to "invention" which will "promote
the progress of science and the useful arts." At the same time, the
question is posed as to whether or not the term "invention" should be
interpreted with sufficient liberality to protect a commercial "exploiter''
14
During 1945, approximately 84,000 patent applications were nled. It may be,
therefore, that this conclusion should be challenged.
It is significant, however, that but approximately 29,000 patents actually issued.
This is a decided drop from I 940 when approximately 49,000 patents were issued.
This increase in new applications filed can, in large part, be attributed to the
release in 1945 of many inventors from war work, and to the general reconversion
activity in industry. Another factor has been the improved financial status of the
independent inventor whose wartime earnings have permitted him to conduct experimental work and finance patent developments on inventions whose conception frequently antedates the war period.
The current restrictions on other forms of speculative investments also have
influenced this increase in patent applications. Financing a patent application involves
a relatively small capital outlay in proportion to the earning potential of a commercially successful invention. It is one of the few ways now open to the "eas.y money''
which interests so many speculators.
The high tax rates on Industry during 1945 ju~tified the filing of many "defensive" patent applications. Where the cost of such applications has , been allowed as a
tax deductible business expense item, tJie net cost to industry has been very low.
At present, therefore, one should study and coordinate the future trends in the
filing of applications and the issuance of patents with the trend in the court decisions
before formulating any final conclusions.
15
Honorable Casper W. Ooms, the present Commissioner of Patents (appointed
July 19, 1945) summarized his views regarding "A Progressive Patent Policy'' in an
address read before the annual meeting of the. American Patent Law Association at
Washington, D.C., October 9, 1945, from which the following significant excerpts
are quoted:
"Any consideration of the P-atent System must include some study of what occurs
to patents after they are issued by the Patent Office. Unfortunately, there are no
comprehensive acceptable data upon this phase of our patent system.
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as distinguished from an "inventdr." 16 Study and consideration is
being given currently to the question as to whether or I not Congress
should _provide a definite test for "invention" instead of leaving the
"We have on the one hand the court decisions in patent litigation, which necessarily deal with only a few of the hundreds of thousands of patents in effect at a
given time. On the other- hand, we have selective studies by individual authors and
by CongressionaL committees, which deal generally with specific probleins raised by
unique uses and abuses of patents. We have no real study of the normal patent-if
there be such-in its wholesome use in an industry which really expresses the free
el).terprise system at work.
, · "Looking to such data as we have, w~ know that the future of the average patent
. as it leaves the Patent Office is not a promising one. We know that most of the patents
that are thrown into litigation are invalidated. Any count of, how many are sustained
and how ~any are rejected is but a popr index to the real life expectancy of any
p;irticular patent that may be issued••••
"Poor as these statistics are, they are all we have. Merely as an indication of
what these statistics show, I have examined the advance sheets of the United States
-Patents Quarterly for the month of September 1945, and I find that in that series of
reports there are reported six patent cases, involving a total of, ten patents, of which
seven were invalidated and three sustained. Looking more closely into 'these cases, I
,find that all of the seven patents were. held invalid as lacking invention, one of them
over the patented prior art, all of which was cited in the Patent Office, and the other
. six merely for want of inventiqn.
"Yet each of these patents left the Patent Office with a presumption of validity.
Each of them licensed its owner to invoke the expensive processes of the District
Court, at a cost of thousands of dollars to the taxpayer, to determine a question 1,1pon
which not one of the District Judges involved had any doubt.· Any progressive patent
policy must find some way of reconciling the standards of judgment exerci~ed in the
litigation of patent cases with the standards of judgment exercised in granting the
patents••••
"You must, if you study the records in the cases upon which the most troublesome decisions have been founded, come to the same conclusion that I have reached,
that is, that if these records were brought separately to each of us in his own office,
as many as h'alf of us would agree with the judgment'reached by the court in each of
those cases. The -difficulty then, is not that there is ,anything fundamentally wrong
with the judicial process by which these principles are enunciated, but that the principles are announced in cases that do not fairly represent the true content of our
living patents, and we have not given the courts any real help in establishing standards by which the question of invention may be tested."
16 The importance of commercial exploitation of inventions was emphasized by
Dr. George W. Crane in his column "The Problem Clinic" in the DETROIT FREE
PRESS I :5, p. 9 (February 12, 1946). He pointed out that Edison, after four years
of experimentation had perfected his motion picture machine and then stopped. The
machine then stood idle in his laboratory for three years before an enterprising
businessman and promoter took it over and launched the motion picture industry. Dr.
Crane terms the salesman and advertiser the "sparkplugs of civilization" and says:
"American progress has been largely a. correlate of our salesmanship and advertising....
·
"Backward nations are low in sales and advertising techniques. 'I'.hey have their
medical scientists, astronomers, physicists and technical inventors. But they don't

,
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matter to be determined by the indefinite tests which have been
applied by the courts in the recent decisions.
Widespread legislative reforms of the patent system probably will
await the findings of the Patent Survey Committee.11 This committee
has prepared a comprehensive working ,agenda which indicates that the
entire patent system is to be studied.18 This committee has the opporhave an adequate supply of salesmen and advertisers. So their scientific products lie
relatively fallow. The public doesn't develop a demand for them."
17
This committee appointed by the Honorable Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of
Commerce, comprises Attorney General Clark, William H. Davis, Dr. Vannevar Bush,
and Charles F. Kettering. Mr. W; Houston Kenyon, Jr., is counsel for the committee.
The committee was appointed at the request of President Truman, "to make a full
and objective study of the operation and effectiveness of the patent laws and their
relation to the purposes of the anti-trust ll\WS and to the post-war economy, together
with specific proposals for such legislation as may seem to be appropriate."
18
Included in the agenda for the working staff of this committee we find the
following questions to be considered:
"Sec. I-Problems relating to patents for spurious or doubtful inventions. ·
"PP IOI. Should Congress enact legislation defining the act of invention or
enumerating specific factors to be taken into consideration in applying the standard?
"PP 102. What, if any, steps should be taken to make the patent system better
adapted to serve its constitutional purpose_ in respect of the output of organized research teams, to the end that (I) the making of true inventions by such teams will
be encouraged, (2) there will be diminished pressure for the issue of patents covering
merely the results of systematic application by such teams of engineering knowledge or
practical skill to special problems and (3) public disclosure of the latter will be
encouraged otherwise than by the grant of patents for the usual term or possessed of
all the usual exclusive rights?
"PP 103. What steps should be taken to reduce the tendency of the Patent
Office to issue patents for non-patentable subject-matter?
, "PP 104. What steps should be taken· to rid the-register of patents already issued
which cover non-patentable subject-matter?
"PP 105. Should changes be made in the facilities available for amending an
issued patent?
·
"Sec. II-Problems relating to the more efficient working of the patent system
within its proper sphere.
"PP 201. :What steps should be taken to simplify the preparation of a patent
application?
"PP 202. What steps should be taken to simplify· and speed the issue of patents?
"PP 203. What steps should be taken to make the enforcement of a patent
simpler and more effective?
"PP 204. Vl;hat steps, if any, should be taken to restore the enforceability of a
patent whose owner is employing his patent. to control or promote the sale of an
unpatented article or material used in the practice of the invention?
"PP 205. What has been the effect of the patent system in promoting the
progress of science and useful arts and what steps can be taken to increase its
effectiveness?
"Sec. III-Problems relating to abuse of patents.
"PP 301. What are the principal classes or types of patent abuse?
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tunity to suggest measures to correct many 0£ the existing evils in
the patent system and can go far in suggesting measures to prevent
many of the abuses which have been the basis for the actual and implied
condemnations of the patent system in recent decisions.
There are relatively few legislative proposals currently pending
for basic reform of the patent laws. Such proposals can be expected
, after the report of the Patent Survey Committee. It is anticipated
"PP 302. What remedies should be created with regard to each defined class of
patent abuse?
"PP 303. What new remedies should be created where there is fraud in the
obtaining, use or enforcement of a patent?
"PP 304. What steps should be taken to free research and commerce from the
restraining influence of (I) ownership of large numbers of related patents by a
co~cern which is dominant in the line of commerce to which the patents relate, and
(2) possession by a common licensing agency of the right to grant licenses under a
large number of related patents owned by many different concerns?
"PP 305. What steps should' be taken "to prevent the partial or total suppression
of patented inventions, other than such remedies as may be proposed in connection
with par. 304 above?
"PP 306. Should patents covering inventions in the fields of public he~th and ..
safety be made subject to compulsory licensing by reason solely of that fact?
"PP 307. Are there any occasions for, or purposes to be served by, compulsory
licensing otherwise than as set forth in the recommendations submitted in connection
with paragraphs 302 to 306 above?
"PP 308. By what machinery and criteria should compulsory licensing be administered in cases where it is recommended?
"PP 309. What steps should be taken to remove the barriers which prevent
juclicial inquiry into the validity of patents collaterally relied on to support agreements
or conduct?
"PP 3 IO. Should the Government or the Patent Office be permitted to exercise
further supervision over the settlement of interferences?
"PP 3 I I . Should legislation requiring the public filing of licenses and other
· agreements relating to patents specify that they should be filed with the Attorney
General or in the Patent Office?
"PP 3 I 2. Should penalties be provided for mis-using the notice "Patent applied
for" in such a maimer as to mislead the public?
"Sec. IV-Re-examination of the scope of the present patent system and the rights
granted under it, in the light of the constitutional objective.
"PP 401. Should limitations in the national interest,be imposed on patents granted
to nationals of foreign countries?
"PP 402. Should subject-matter now within the scope of patent protection be
removed therefrom?
"PP 403: Should subject-matter not now within the scope of patent protection
be included therein?
1
"PP 404. Should there be legislation permitting the taking of patents by eminent domain?
"PP 405. What rewards for inventions might be offered other than the present
I 7-year grant of exclusive rights?
"PP 406. Do the provisions of Sec. 4901 of the Revised Statutes, which provide
for action by an informer, serve a useful purpose under present conditions?"
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that legislation will be proposed to curb restrictive pooling of patents
or withholding of patents. Proposals for governmental assistance in
developing and exploiting inventions and scientific discoveries and for
establishing a National Research Foundation have been embodied in
various legislative proposals upon which extensive public hearings
have been held but no action has been taken on them. Proposals for a
patent court composed of judges skilled in patent matters probably
should be anticipated.
Among the most controversial of the reforms proposed at various
times are the proposals seeking the "compulsory licensing" of patents.19
This subject has been incorporated in several bills introduced in
Congress. It has been the subject of much discussion in the· committee hearings. Proponents of such bills point out that many of the
abuses of the patent system could in a large measure be avoided if a
compulsory licensing system were ~dopted which presumably would
make all patents available to industry on the same terms. 20 Opponents
19

The "compulsory" licensing of patents usually is advanced as a remedy for
some of the legendary instances of non-user of valuable patents. Most lawyers have
heard the oft-repeated stories of the carburetor which permits a car to be operated
for one hundred ( 100) or more miles per gallon of gasoline; of energy sources which
render obsolete all present power systems; of everlasting safety razor blades; of radio
sets which require no radio tubes; of the automobile which operates for its lifetime
on the small black box which replaces the motor and requires no fuel; of the magic
chemical tablets which convert tap water into motor car fuel; of "perpetual" or
"cosmic" motion machines-all of which the "vested interests" keep from public view,
presumably because of the capital investments which would be jeopardized if these
"revolutionary'' inventions were to be introduced commercially.
These and similar rumors have been and are so persistent that credence frequently is given to them without factual investigation. The Oldfield investigation in
1914 and the T.N.E.C. hearings of 1938 did not develop any factual basis for these
charges.
The WASHINGTON DAILY NEws for Oct. 3, 194-1, gives the experiences of a
reporter assigned to run down a suppressed patent which would radically increase the
gasoline mileage.· His experience is the same as that of many patent attorneys and
others who have sought unsuccessfully to find the factual basis for these or others of the
legendary host of "suppressed" inventions.
20 A limited licensing plan under which the government could grant licenses
under suppressed or unused patents would be effective insurance against abuses. Such
a plan could be comparable to the Canadian system of modified compulsory licensing
which was established in 1923. Since that time there have been but two such licenses
granted in Canada. England has had a comi,ulsory licensing statute since 1883 and
but five licenses have been ordered under it since that time. The German licensing
statute was placed in operation in 1877. Thirty-one licenses were granted under it
· during the period from 19II to 1934.
Apparently, there is no general demand for compulsory licenses in these countries where such statutes are in effect. It is unlikely that the demand for such licenses
in the United States would follow any substantially different course.
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of this legislation have pointed out with force that the general compulsory licensing of all patents would negative the incentive required
to sponsor new inventions and discoveries. Who would ·finance the
research and development programs and who would take the financial
risks involved in the commercial introduction of new patented products if everyone else could have a licepse under any patent on the new
products?
The experience of the Alien Property Custodian in attempting to
grant licenses on a uniform nominal royalty basis under all of the seized
alien enemy patents and patent applications, to anyone desiring such
licenses, indicates that industry generally is not interested in securing
a license under patents which are to be free to all competitors upon the
same terms. Despite excellent promotional work on the part of the
Alien Property Custodian very few licenses have been granted under
these patents and applications.
The proposals for the general "compulsory licensing" of all patents ignore for the most part the history of our industrial development
under the existing patent system which seems to have proved that a
prospective pecuniary reward is an e:ffective inducement to the inventors of the entire world to disclose their inventions through our
patent system. The patents which have been issued have encouraged
the investment of the speculative capital required to develop and commercialize these inventions. Our national economy, in large part based
on our patent system, has produced the greatest number of practical
inventions pertaining to science and the useful arts ever known in the
history of mankind. It is significant that those nations with systems
which do not adequately protect their inventors have been among the
more backward commercial nations. Undoubtedly changing economic
conditions and the present state of our industrial development requires
that a re-examination be made into the fundamental concepts of our
patent system. Drastic reforms which aim to change the fundamental
aspects of the patent laws, should, however, be undertaken with caution. Any patent system should have for its end, aim and objective
the encouragement of new inventions, for as Sir Francis Bacon commented many years ago,
"The introduction of new •inventions seemeth to be the very
chief of all human actions. The benefit of new inventions may
extend to all mankind unreservedly, but the good of political
achievements can respect but some particular cantons of men;
these latter do not endure above a few ages, the former forever.
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Inventions make all men happy without either injury or damage to any one single persop." 2 i
V
RECENT SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
CouRT INVOLVING THE PATENT LAWS

Among the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
are some of particular significance as affecting basic concepts of the
patent law. In certain respects these decisions may be considered as a
judicial partial "re-statement" of the law of patents.
A tendency toward greater liberality in granting writs of certiorari
in patent cases has been noted.
In Muncie Gear Works, Incorporated v. Outboard, Marine and
Manufacturing Company 22 a petition for a writ of certiorari to review
a decree in a patent infringement suit was granted, notwithstanding
the absence of a conflict of decisions between circuit courts of appeal
as to the scope or the validity of the patent. The location of the industry in ~ single circuit which' made the possibility of litigation in
other circuits unlikely, together with the nature of the questions presented, was given as justification for granting the petition.
Certiorari was also granted in United Carbon Company v. Binney
and Smith Company 28 to review the decision of the Fourth Circuit.
Court of Appeals holding the patent in suit to be valid and infringed.
The petition for certiorari points out the public importance of having
the patent measured by the standards set by the Supreme Court and
the petition was granted even though there was no conflict between
courts in different circuits.
These cases show a trend toward greater liberality in granting petitions for certiorari in patent cases and it may be that this is the way
which the Supreme Court will take to provide the "all encompassing
oversight" by which "a miscellany of holdings" can be "pounded into
a code of patent law," the need for which is stated by Hamilton.2 '1.
The requirement that an invention to be patentable must have resulted from a "Flash of Genius" has precipitated µmch learned comment and discussion. This reqµirement was given strong judicial
21
22

23

l STUART ON STEAM 216 (1829).
315 U.S. 759, 62 S. Ct. 865 (1942).
317 U.S. 228, 63 S. Ct. 165 (1942).

2
'1- HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE, Monograph 31, Temporary
• Natl. Economic Comm., p. 134 ( l 941).
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-sanction, in Cuno Engineering Corporation v. Automatic Devices Corporation25 and in its companion case, Aut~matic Devices Corporation
v. Sinko Tool and Manufacturing Company. 26 In these cases, the
Court held the Mead Patent No. r,736,544.invalid for "want of invention." In 'the decision, the history of the prior art is reviewed and
the Court concludes that to incorporate the old thermostatic controls
in the known so-called "wireless" or "cordless" cigar lighter did not
comprise an "invention" or "discovery" within the meaning of the
patent law. The Court in its opinion concedes that the functions performed by Mead's combination of these elements were both new a_nd
useful but held that-these aonsiderations do not necessarily make the
device patentable. The C~mrt then says:
, "That is to say the new device, however useful it may be, must
reveal the flash of creative genius not merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its right to a private grant on
the public domain." 21 ,
The Court then points out that:
_"Strict application of that test is necessary lest in the constant
demand for new appliances the heavy hand of tribute be laid on
each slight technological advance in an art. The consequences of
the alternative course were forcefully pointed out by Mr. Justice
Bradley in Atlantic Works v. Brady, ro7 U.S: r92, 200, 27 L.
Ed. 438, 44'I, 2 S. Ct. 225: 'Such an indiscriminate creation of
exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it
their b;usiness to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and
gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable
them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without
contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits and
vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith.' " 28
The doctrine announced in the Cuno case has been the subject of
much critical analytical comment, some of which has been published.20
25

314 U.S. 84, 62 S. Ct. 37 (1941).
Jl4 U.S. 94, 62 S. Ct. 42 (1941).
27
Id. at 91.
28
Id. at 92.
_
26

29 The following partial list of the published comments on the Cuno case reflect to
some extent the concern of the Patent Bar and other students of the patent system lest
a literal application of the announced rule provides the basis for a large scale judicial
attack on the patent system.
Galston, "The Imperilled Position of Our Patent System," z7 J. PAT. OFF. Soc.
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The "Flash of Genius" doctrine is the subject of active debate in patent
law circles.
It may be that the "Flash of Genius" doctrine has been taken
somewhat more literally than was intended by the Court. The test of
invention suggested and applied by the Court in the later case of Sinclair & Carroll Company v. Inter-chemical Corporation 80 places the
emphasis on the innovation rather than the "quality of the inventor's
mind." The test for "invention" as here applied by the Court is silent
as to the "Flash of Creative Genius" doctrine or test. The patent iri
suit was held to be invalid for want of "invention," as the Court found
that it did not meet the test for "invention" which the Court here
applies and described as follows:
"Under this test, some substantial innovation is necessary, an innovation for which society is truly indebted to the efforts of the
patentee. Whether or not those efforts are of a~special kind does
not concern us. The primary purpose of our patent system is '
not reward of the individual but the advancement of the arts and
sciences. Its inducement is directed to disclosure of advances in
knowledge which will be beneficial to society; it is not a certificate of merit, but an incentive to disclosure. [ Citing authority]
•... Consequently it is not concerned with the quality of the inventor's mind, but with the quality of his product." 81
These cases but highlight the need for some workable standard of
invention which can be applied by the patent office as well as by the
courts. There is some considerable agitation for a legislative definition
of invention. In Van Heusen Products, Incorporated v. Earl and Wilson,82 the court outlined the arguments against objective tests for invention when it stated:
"The prospect of getting objective test for invention is tempting, but it is a mirage. How is it possible to say a priori what combination of elements needs an original twist of the mind, and what
is within the compass of the ordinary clod? Is it not clear that the
quality of a man's inventiveness must be tested by reconstituting
513 (1945); "Standard of Invention," 26 id. 439 (1944); Woodling, ''What's a
Good Yardstick for Patentability?" 26 id. 320 (1944); 25 id. 771 (1943); Boyajian,
"The Flash of Creative Genius an Alternative Interpretation," id. 776 (1943); Barnett, "The 'Flash of Genius' Fallacy," id. 78 5 ( I 943); Allyn, "Patentable Yardsticks,"
id. 791 (1943); Dienner, "The Flash of Genius Concept," J. of CoMMERCE AND
COMMERCIAL§ 2, 39 (March 11, 1943); II GEO. WASH. L. REv. 535 (1943).
80
325 U.S. 327, 65 S. Ct. 1143 (1945).
81
Id. at 330-331.
82
(D.C. N.Y. 1924) 300 F. 922.
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the situation as it was in the light of the preceding history of the
art? There is no vade mecum for such inquiries. Our unknown
ancestor who first substituted iron for bronze in the head of an
axe, was the bright exemplar _of all inventors, to come yet it was
not an invention, if one is bound by this objective test. In this
subject the standard escapes any abstract definition, because the
end in view needs nicer adaptations, in the cases of due care or
notice. The defect of such a standard is indeed its uncertainty,
but certainty is only one of the ends of law." 88

as

The whole problem of what shall constitute "invention" can be
considered as but a reflection- of the long existing confusion as to how
the public purpose underlying the patent laws is to be best served.
There is no doubt that some "progress of science and the useful arts"
will continue and that "Flashes of Genius" will occur without the incentive offer~d by the present patent laws. 84 It is impossible to predict
the extent to which such "progress" may be retarded by the present
judicial attitude toward· the patent laws, or by legislative changes in
the fundamental concepts of the patent laws.
Instead of arguing for or against an objective "standard" or "definition" of invention, it would seem that the decisions of the courts
making "invention" the prime requirement for "patentability" presents
to Congress the need for a declaration of policy as to how p~tentability
shall be determined. Any basic reform of the patent laws should begin
with a cla~ified understanding and a legislative statement of the basic
·
purpose of the patent laws.85
88

Id. at 929.
In Hart, et al., "Preliminary Conclusions from a Study of Inventors," 21
PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN SocioLoGICAL SocIETY 191 (1927), the author reports some significant facts drawn from his study of the lives of 171 inventors mentioned
in KAEMFFERT, A POPULAR HISTORY oF AMERICAN INVENTION (1924). Professor
Hart presents strong support for his conclusion that the tacit assumption of financial return as being one ot the great incentives of inventors is false~ His figures show that this
assumption of financi~ return appeared as an actual stimulation for invention but five
times in the entire group of 171 inventors. In RossMAN, THE PsYCHOLOGY OF THE
INVENTOR (1924) similar conclusions are reported.
85
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in part in Marconi Wireless Telegraph
Company of America v. United States, 320 U.S. I at 63-64, 63 S. Ct. 1393 (1943)
stated:
"I have little doubt, in so far as I am entitled to express an opinion, that the
vast transforming forces of technology have rendered obsolete much in our patent law.
For all I know the basic assumption of our patent law may be false, and inventors and
their financial backers do not need the incentive of a limited monopoly to stimulate
invention. But whatever revamping our patent laws may need, it is the business of
Congress to do the revamping. We have neither constitutional authority nor scientific
competence for the task." Id. at 64.
84
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If the assumption of financial return is not an actual stimulus to
the individual inventor, the patent laws and the reforms suggested
should be viewed, not in the light of the effect on the individual inventor, but instead should be viewed from the standpoint of the stimulus which the patent system should giv:e to secure exploitation of
inventions and the financing of the inventor in his creative work.
It is time that some definite recognition be given in our patent
laws to the important public service rendered by those who finance, and
exploit "inventions." It is the work of this group which brings down to
earth and harnesses for the public good the power inherent in the
"Flashes of Genius" of an inventor.
Regardless of the effect of patents as a stimulus to the activity of
the individual inventor, there can be no question but that the protection previously afforded by the patent laws to those who would com!llercialize inventions has been a most important factor in securing the
capital to finance the experimentation and research required to make
inventions, and to commercialize and make available to the general
public the products of invention.
The activity of the courts in so generally invalidating patents "for
want of invention" has seriously affected the whole basis for capital
investment in the exploitation of inventions. A legislative statement
of policy as to what shall be "patentable" could go far to remedy this
situation.36 Those who are willing to venture highly speculative capital upon an invention should be encouraged and rewarded with something more than the very uncertain, protection presently afforded by
our patent laws.
In Bryant Electric Company v. Reno Sales Company 31 the court
said:
86
The addition to the patent statutes of a provision to curtail the activities of
the courts in invalidating patents and to curtail the Patent Office in rejecting applications for "want of invention" would remove some of the present uncertainty which
surrounds both the securing and "the enforcing· of a patent. It could put the emphasis
on factors of patentability now considered lightly if at all by both the courts and the
Patent Office in their most recent decisions. A proposal for a statutory provision which
has been suggested to the Patent Survey Committee provides that:
"No issued patent shall be invalidated, and no application for a patent shall be
refused, for want of invention in any case in which the patentee or applicant shall
show that the invention or discovery disclosed in said patent or said applicant there-fore has promoted the progress of science and the useful arts by:
1. Solving, ·at the time of making said invention or discovery, a problem then
existing in the science or ,useful art to which it appertains, or
2. Providing an article of commerce which creates a new market, supplies an
existing need, or fills a long felt public want."

n (D.C. N.Y. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 789.

'
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"Theoretically there is nothing new; what is 'discovered' existe_d before discovery. The incentive is really given to 'discover' that
which already exists, provided. the discovery adds something,
however slight, to the sum total of commercial life.in a useful and
practical manner.',' ss
A study of the current decisions passing on what constitutes "invention" reminds one of the hallowed rules of equity which varied
with the "chancellor's foot." If the current decisions set a "standard
of invention"• it is such a relative "standard" that discussion of "raising'' or of "lowering''· it but adds to the confusion. The court decisions
do not provide Congress with a "standard" that can either be "raised"
or "lowered" by legislative enactment. The crux of the whole situa.tion lies first in ascert~ining the public ends which are to be served by
t:he patent laws, and then to fix those standards of patentability which
will be definite and certain to achieve the desired ends. "Invention"
is one factor to consider in deterniinini what is patentable-it should
not, as at present, be the sole factor.
If the entire question is resolved in the light of the broad constitutional language so that any suggested legislation has for its purpose the
promotion of "progress" in "science and the useful arts," no constitutional questions would seem to be involved in fixing by legislation a
"standard" of patentability. The Constitution gives to Congress broad
powers "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts" but
leaves to Congress the problem of the administration of the patent laws
and the regulation of the patent privilege. The Constitution is silent
as to what shall be the "standards of invention" or of "patentability."
This entire question of "invention" has arisen primarily as one of
"judicial legislation."
There is a growing recognition in the Supreme Court that it is the
duty of the courts to examine into the validity and the probable effect
on the public of patents involved in litigation before them even though
the issues as framed by the private litigants may not require the court
to consider the validity of such patents.
In Exhibit Supply Company v. Ace Patents Corporation 89 the Nelson Patent No. 2,ro9,678 was strictly construed and in the majority
opinion was held not to be infringed. The differences between the
- claim as originally presented and the claim as amended and allowed
were considered and the disclaimer by amendment was construed
the patentee. The philosophy expressed in the dissentstrictly against
,
,

88
89

Id. at 793.
315 U.~. 126, 62 S. Ct. 513 (1942).
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ing opinion of Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas concurred,
has particular significance in view of its forceful emphasis on the protection of the public interest in private patent litigation. Here we find
the view expressed that:
"There can be no infringement of a void patent, and a patent
which shows neither invention nor discovery is void. The mere
application of an old mechanical instrument to a new use is not an
invention and therefore not patentable." 40
,
•
Also in the dissenting opinion we find the statem~nt that:
"Patentees have rights given them by law. 'But the public has
rights also. The rights of both should be upheld and enforced by
an, equally firm hand, whenever they come under judicial consideration.' By failing to, assign error on the issue of patentability,
parties to an infringement suit should not be permitted to foreclose a court from protecting the public interest." 41
In Williams Mapufacturing Company v. United Shoe Machinery
Corporation 42 the majority opinion refused to disturb the concurrent
findings of the district court and the circuit court of appeals as to the
validity and infringement of the patent. Having granted certiorari
on limited grounds, the Court, in the majority opinion, considered only
these grounds and refused to redetermine the broader questions of
novelty and usefulness of the improvements described in the combination claims which had been held valid an4_ infringed by the lower
courts. The dissenting opinion of Justice Black (with whom Justice
Douglas and Justice Murphy concurred) repeats the earlier stated
view of the dissenting opinion in Exhibit Supply Company v. Ace Patents Corporation 48 that it is the duty of the court to inquire into the
_ validity of the patents in suit. The e:ffect on the public of the :use to
which such patents are put by the patent owner is the subject of concern expressed in the dissenting opinion. In concluding the dissenting
opinion, Mr. Justice Black states:
As I view this patent its total impact is appalling. Out of its great
bulk, the respondent is able to assert only three simple improvements embraced in five claims. And on examination, it appears
that these improvements fall far below the established requirements of patentable invention. Yet by its terms the patent as a
whole purports to appropriate for exclusive use, not merely these
40

Id. at 137-138.
Id. at 138.
42
316 U.S. 364, 62 S. Ct. 1179 (1942).
48
Supra, 36.
41
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improvements, but a major instrument of production in its entirety. Furthermore, this patent is one of a group which seems to
have an interminable capacity for self-perpetuation. If judicial
approval is to be given to patents of this kind, the public benefits
which might reasonably be hoped for under the constitutional
provisions a_nd the federal statutes relating to patents can never be
attained." "
The underlying philosophy of the dissenting opinion in this case
would seem to require that a court, regardless of the particular issues
of infringement presented by the litigants in a patent suit, should look
through these issues and determine the fundamental questions regarding the validity of the patent.
The public interest in the probable commercial activities of a
prospective patentee was advanced by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, as a reason for affirming the judgment of the
lower court which had denied the right of plaintiff to a patent in Special Equipment Company v. Coe.45 The opinion of the court was written by Associate Judge Thurman W. Arnold and is one logical extension of the doctrines advanced by certain of the justices of the
Supreme Court that the validity of a patent is a matter of such public
importance that the court should consider it in every cas~. The patent
sought covered an operative sub-combination of elements of a fruit
paring machine. The patent was refused on the ground that, if issued,
the patent would be a "fencing'' or "blocking" type of patent. The
opinion of the court of appeals wrote into the patent law a provision
that the probable use to which a patent might 9e put by the patent
holder should be considered in deciding whether or not a patent should
_
be granted.
The Supreme Court in its majority opinion reversed the decision
of the court of appeals.46 The majority opinion holds that a combination embodied in complete machine may also embrace a sub-combination which may be separately patented. As an answer to the argument
as to probable "suppression" of the patent, the majority opinion points
out the absence of congressional policy on this point and holds that a
patentee is entirely within his legal rights to withhold such a patent.
The dissenting opinion in this case was written by Justice Douglas
and is concurred in by Justice Black and Justice Murphy. In this
opinion there is a clear statement tha~ the rule permitting patent sup-

a

" Id. at 393-394.
45 (C.C. D.C. 1,944) 144 F. (2d) 497.
6
'
324 U.S. 370, 65 S. Ct. 741 (1945).
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pression is inconsistent with the patent provisions of the Constitution
and t:I:ie legislation which Congress has enacted thereunder. The dissenting opinion cites Hamilton Monograph No. 3r as to the effect of
blocking off a whole technology by the issuance of an improvement
patent. The dissenting opinion then states:
"I think it is tim.e to return to the earlier, and I think the true,
philosophy of the patent system. We should not pass on to Congress the duty to remove the private prerequisites which we have
engrafted on the patent laws. This Court was responsible for
their creation. This court should take the responsibility for their
removal. ... [ Citing authority]. It should withhold its aid from
a patentee who has employed or plans to employ the patent not
to exploit the invention but to suppress it in order to protect
another patent or otherwise. . . . [ Citing authority] . If that purpose were clear, a patent should not issue in the first instance.
If it has been issued and not cancelled and the patent has been
suppressed, any one should be permitted to use it at least on payment of reasonable royalties. In that way the constitutional objective will be more nearly realized-the product of the inventive
genius of the human mind will be put to work in the economy." 47
The dissenting opinion in Special Equipment Cpmpany v. Coe 48
raises the old question as to the nature of a patent. Is it a form of
property, or is it a privilege? The opinion of the court of appeals in this
case reflects the views expressed by Thurman W. Arnold in his speeches
and written articles prior to his judicial appointment, i.e., that a patent
is not a form of property but is a privilege. Hamilton's Monograph No.
3r makes the same assertion. The dissenting Justices in Special Equipment Company v. Coe make clear their position that:
"It is a mistake therefore to conceive of a patent as but another
form of private property. The patent is a privilege 'conditioned
by a public purpose.' [ Citing authority] .... The public purpose
is 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' The exclusive right of the inventor is but the means to that end." 49
47

Id. at 383-384.

48

324 U.S. 370, 65 S. Ct. 741 (1945).
Id. at 382. Jefferson in his letter to Isaac McPherson, PADOVER, THE CoMPLETE JEFFERSON 1015 (1943), wrote:
49

"That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral,
and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been
peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in
which we bre_athe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or
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In Mercoid Corporation v. Mid Continent Investment Company 50
decided prior to Special Equipment Company v. Coe the majority
opinion written by, Justice Douglas takes the position that:
"The grant of a patent is the grant of a special privilege 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' mi
The contrary position is well stated in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Jackson that:
" 'A patent,' said Mr~ Justice Holmes, 'is property carried to the
highest degree of abstraction-a right in rem to exclude, without
a physical object or content.'" 52
The confusion which exists as to these two concepts of the nature
of a patent is reflected in the majority opinion in the Mercoid case.
After asserting again that a patent is a "privilege," the f:Ourt then
states:
"When the patentee ties something else to his invention, he acts
only by virtue of his right as the owner of property to make contracts concerning
it and not otherwise."-53
'
I
However, a contrary view is stated in Hartford-Empire Company
v. ,United States 54 -in which,the majority opinion holds:
"Tliat a patent is property, protected against appropriation both
by individuals and by government, has long been settled. In
recognition of this quality of a patent the courts, in enjoining
violations of the Sherman Act arising from the use of patent
licenses, agreements, and leases have abstained from action which
amounted to a forfeiture of the patents." 55
,
These decisions but highlight the need for clarification in the
fundamental concepts of the patent law. Whether a patent is a "privilege" or whether it is "property" is a question which has not been
· finally det~rmined.
exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be
done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint
from anybody."
liO
51

320 U.S. 661, 64

s. Ct.

268 (1944).

Id. at 665.
52
Id. at 678-679.
53 Id. at 666. (Italics added.)
54

323 U.S. 386, 65 S. Ct. 373 (1945).

55

Id.-at 415.
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There can be no question but that the patent laws must be made
to serve their constitutional public purpose. There is no denying that
there have been abuses, particularly in those instances where patents
have been utilized as a cloak to hide violation of the anti-trust laws.
It is believed, however, that the existing laws are adequate to control
such abuses.
In Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continent Investment Company/ 6
Justice Douglas in writing the majority opinion of the Court makes this
clear when he states:
"It is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system .
• . . [ Citing authority]. It is the protection of the public in a system of free enterprise which alike nullifies a patent where any
part of it is invalid.... [ Citing authority] and denies to the patentee after issuance the power to use it in such a way as to acquire
a monopoly which is not plainly within the terms of the grant.
The necessities or convenience of the patentee do not justify any
use of the monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly.
The fact that the patentee has the power to refuse a license does
not enable him to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by the expedient of attaching conditions to its use. . • • [ Citing authority].
The method by which the monopoly is sought to be extended is
immaterial. . . . [ Citing authority] . The patent is a privilege.
But it is a privilege which is conditioned by a public purpose. It
results from invention and is limited to the invention which it
defines. When the patentee ties something else to his invention,
he acts only by virtue of his right as the owner of property to
make contracts concerning it and not otherwise. He then is subject to all the limitations upon that right which the general law
imposes upon such contracts. The contract is not saved by anything in the patent laws because it relates to the invention. If it
were, the m<rre act of the patentee could make the distinctive claim
of the patent attach to something which does not possess the qual' ity of invention. Then the patent would be diverted from its
statutory purpose and become a ready instrument for economic
control in domains where the anti-trust acts or other laws not the
patent statutes define the public policy." 57
In the companion case, Mercoid Corporation v. MinneapolisHoneywell Regulator Company,5 8 the Court, in denying the relief
sought, says: ·
56

320 U.S. 661, 64 S. Ct. 268 (1944).
Id. at 665-666.
58
320 U.S. 680, 64 S. Ct. 278 (1944).
57
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". . . an unpatented part of a combination patent is no more
entitled to monopolistic protection than any other unpatented
device." 59
The holding of the Court measures the legality of the attempt to
bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent, by the antitrust laws, not the patent laws.
In line with the general theory of restricting the rights of a patentee
in view of the public interest, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Univis Lens Company 60 suppressed an entire patent licensing system
because of its illegality under the Sherman Act for placing restrictions on the resale price of finished lenses where the lens blanks had
been sold and later converted into- the finished product. While the
direct issue involved in this litigation concerned the validity of the
licensing contracts under the provisions of the Sherman Act the Court
discusses a limitation on a patentee's dealings under his patent and says:
" ... where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because
it embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within
the protection of his patent, and' has destined the article to be
finished by the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold
his invention so far as it is or may be embodied in that particular
article. The reward he has demanded and received is for the
article and the invention which it eip.bodies and which his vendee
is to practice upon it. He has thus parted with his right to assert
the patent monopoly with respect. to it and is no longer free to
control the price at which it may be sold either in its unfinished
or finished form." 61

United States v. Masonite Corporation 62 is another case arising
under the anti-trust laws. Here the Court stated the broad proposition that:
"The owner of a patent cannot extend his statutory grant by
contract or agreement. A patent affords no immunity for a monopoly not fairly or plainly within the grant.... Beyond the limited
monopoly which is granted, the arrangements by which the patent
is utilized are subject to the general law.... [Citing cases]." 63
59

Id. at 684.
316 U.S. 241, 62 S. Ct. 1088 (1942).
61 Id. at 250-251.
62
316 U.S. 265, 62 S. Ct. 1070 (1942).
\
68
Id. at 277.
60
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In Hartford-Empir; Company v. United States, e4e the majority
opinion of the Court found violation of the Sherman Act arising from
the misuse of patent licenses, agreements and leases, but refused to
affirm the ruling of the lower court which decreed a forfeiture· of I the
patents involved.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Rutledge, concurred in by
Justice Black, we find a statement of the position of those who believe
that the fundamental concept of the patent law and of the anti-trust
laws are in conflict. The dissenting opinion says:
"The case presents again the fundamental problem of accommodating the provisions of the patent laws to those of the anti-trust
statutes. Basically these are opposed in policy, the one granting
rights of monopoly, the other forbidding monopolistic activities.
The patent legislation presents a special case, the anti-trust legislation the nation's general policy. Whether the one or the other
is wise is not for us to determine. But their accommodation is one
we must make, within the limits allowed to the judicial function,
when the issue is presented.
"The general policy has been to restrict the right of the patent
holder rigidly within the terms of his grant and, when he overreaches its boundary, to deny him the usual protections of_ the
holder of property. That this ordinarily has been done in infringement suits or suits for cancellation does not qualify the fact or the
policy. On the other hand, the anti-trust statutes have received a
broad construction and corresponding enforcement, where violation has been clearly shown. When the patent-holder so far overreaches his privilege as to intrude upon the rights of others and
the public protected by the anti-trust legislation, and does this in
such a way that he cannot further exercise the privilege without
also trespassing upon the rights thus protected, either this right
or the other person's and the public right, must give way. It is
wholly incongruous in such circumstances to say that the privilege of the trespasser shall be preserved and the rights of all
others which he has transgressed shall continue to give way to the
consequences of his wrongdoing." 65
One injured by the illegal acts of a patent owner may be protected
through the application of the general maxims of equity. In recent
patent cases in the United States Supreme Court, relief for infringement of seven patents has been denied upon equitable grounds. These
G4e
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cases give new emphasis to the application of general equity' maxims
to patent suits, and while the court has refused to invalidate patents
where they have been used as a part of an inequitable scheme or plan, ·
as in the Hartford-Empire ,case it has refused relief to a patentee in
the following cases in which inequitable conduct was found:
In Morton Salt Compqny v. G: S. Suppiger Company, 66 the Court
withheld its aid when it found that the plaintiff was using the asserted·
patent right contrary to the- public interest.
In B. B. Chemical Company v. Ellis 61 equitable relief was refused
on the ground that the suit to restrain any: form of infringement in· view
of the petitioner's use of the patent as a means of establishing a limit,ed monopoly in unpatented materials was contrary to public policy.
In the H ar'tford-Empire case 68 the. court summarized the doctrine
of the Morton Salt Company c.ase and the B. B. Chemical Company
c.ase when it said:
· •"But those cases merely apply the doctrine that, so lol].g as the
owner is using his patent-in violation of the anti-trust laws, he
cannot restrain infringement of it by others. We were not there
concerned with the problem whether, when a violation of the antitrust laws was to be restrained and discontinued, the Court could,
as a part of the relief, forfeit the patents of those who had been
guilty of the violation." 69
In Precision Instrument Manufacturing Company v. Automotive '
Maintenance Machinery Company 10 the Court in refusing relief and
•affirming the dismissal of the complaint referred to the doctrine of
"unclean hands" and said:
' "The public policy against the assertion and enforcement of
patent claims infected with fraud and perjury is too great to be
overridden...." 71.

In the Mercoid case the Court refused relief because of tlie illegal
acts of the patentee in attempting to a,ssert a monopoly which the Court
. . found to be broader than that of the patent.
These applications of general equitable maxims in the :field of patent law is a particularly desirable method of controlling the conduct
of patent holders, for it permits the consideration of each case on its
66
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merits and is flexible enough to prevent :flagrant abuses of the patent
system without requiring fundamental changes in the.body o.f the patent law.
.
The public interest in the' patent system. and in the methods of
exploitation of the patents requires a continuing general application of
the equitable maxims to patent litigation, particularly where the patent
holder attempts, under the guise of a patent, to exercise rights not
granted in the, patent and not within the legitimate scope of the patent
claims. With the expiration of many of the older and broader patents,
the public has substantial rights in the fields previously covered by
them. Such narrow improvement patents as may be utilized to control competition in these industries must be so exploited by the patent
holders that the public rights in these fields will not be foreclosed.
This is but elemental equity and 'as such is within the province of the
courts to enforce.
Clarification is required as to what patent policies will best serve
the public interest. It is a matter of speculation whether the extreme
view taken in Potts v. Coe 12 can be justified on any broad considerations of sound public policy.
In this case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
an opinion written by Associate Justices Arnold and Miller denied
certain claims in an application for a patent assigned to a corporate
assignee for work done by one of its employees in the course of the
organized technical research work of the corporation.
The court, in its opinion, refers t-0 the fact that the real applicant
for the patent is a subsidiary (Western Electric Company) of a corporate system (American Telephone and Telegraph Company) which
in the year r935 owned about nine thousand patents in the communication field and had pending about fifteen hundred applications for
additional patents. The opinion also takes judicial notice of the practices of "organized research" and then says:
"W.e are bound to interpret the patent law in the light of its purpose declared by the Supreme Court, to reward individual and
not group achievement. Having that purpose in mind we cannot
ignore the plain "facts of the technological revolution which has
occurred in the research laboratory." 78
The issues before the court involved but a few of the claims in the
application. Other claims, which had been allowed in the Patent Office were not before the court.
72
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The issue raised in this opinion must be solved if the future development of the patent law is to keep pace with technological changes.
With scientific and technical research now highly organized and
requiring large outlays of both capital and manpower, some means for
protecting such investments must be found. Such large scale research
cannot be successful unless it is adequately-financed. Prior to the Potts
. case it was believed that the public purpose of the patent laws was
served by permitting a company which assumed the risk of such experimentation and research to secur-e patent protection covedng the inventions produced in its laboratories. Since the chief value to tlie public
of such research and experimental work lies in its early publication, it
would seem that the strict application of the doctrine stated in the
Potts case would result in defeating this basic purpose of the patent
law. It seems inconceivable that the free exchange of information betwren technical and scientific research group,s would proceed at the
same pace if the only protection for the financial groups backing such
organizations is that of secrecy or concealment of the "know how"
which is developed in their laboratories.
The alternative to granting patents and permitting them to be
owned by the private corporations which finance the research, experimentation and development work may be some governmentaJly sponsored research program such as would result from passage of bills now
pending in Congress. It is certain that unless research and development programs are adequately financed the basic discoveries and basic
inventions of the future cannot be made at the same rate that they have
been in the past. Unless som,e workable substitute foi:: the present
system is suggested, the inventions which are made may be -withheld
-from the public, perhaps for all time, because of the failure to encourage the publication ,of such inventions.
To many students of patent law there is a question as to whether
there is now left in the patent law anything of the former doctrine of
"contributory infringement." While both the majority and the minority opinions in Mercoid _Corporation v. Mid-Continent Investment
Company u criticize the doctrine of "contributory infringement," it
should be recalled that there are many instances of infringement by
joint tort-feasors. In some instances the rule of liability for a jointly
committed tort should apply in cases of patent infringement. This is
particularly true in those cases in which there is no question of an
abuse of the patent or an extension of the doctrine to support an illegal
plan of exploitation of the patent. It is clear from a study of the ma74
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jority opinion that the Court was concerned primarily with the public
effect of finding contributory infringement where the patent in suit
had been exploited by the patent holder in a manner which the Court
found was against the public interest.
In a companion case, Mercoid Corporation v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company,1 5 the Court refused a decree to respondent
on the ground that such a decree might directly or indirectly help to
subvert the public policy which underlies the grant of a patent. The
Court states the rule that:
"The fact that an unpatented part of a combination patent may
distinguish the invention does not draw to it the privileges of a
patent. That may be done only in the manner provided by law." 76
The literature contains a full discussion as to the effect of the
Mercoid d~cisions on the doctrine of contributory infringement and the
nature of the patent grant.77 There is no question but that the Mercoid cases are "milestones" in the development of modern patent law.
The decision in Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America
v. United States 78 does not establish any new principles of patent law.
In holding certain of the Marconi patents invalid, the majority of the
Court reviewed much scientific data in the complicated field of ·"wireless telegraphy" and disagreed with the popular and scientific appraisal
of Marconi's work under which •Marconi had been accepted as the
originator of "wireless." This decision has given added impetus to
the arguments for a special court composed of scientifically trained
judges to try patent cases. Particular support for the creation of such
a court is found in the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter when
he stated:
"It is an old observation that the training of Anglo-American
judges ill fits them to discharge the duties cast upon them by patent legislation. The scientific attainments of a Lord Moulton are
perhaps unique in the annals of the English-speaking judiciary.
However, so long as the Congress, for the purposes of patent320 U.S. 680, 64 S.Ct. 278 (1944).
Id. at 684.
77 The following is a partial list of published articles and comments on the effect
of the Mercoid decisions:
Wood, "The Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications," 13 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
(1944); Matthews, "Contributory Infringement and the Mercoid Case," 27 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc. 260 (1945); Waite, "Has Contributory Infringement Been Repudiated?"
42 M1cH. L. REv. 915 (1944); Wiles, "Joint Trespasses on Patent Property," 30
A.B.A.J. 454 (1944); 12 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 345 (1944); 44 CoL. L. REv. 447
(1944); 57 HARV. L. REv. 574 (1944); 92 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 461 (1944).
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ability, makes the determination of originality a judicial function,
judges must overcome their scientific incompetence as best they can.
. But consciousness of their limitations should make them vigilant
against importing their own notions of the nature of the creative
proc~ss ·into congressional legislation, whereby Congress 'to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts' has secured 'for
limited times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ...
Discoveries.' Above all, judges must avoid the subtle temptation
of taking scientific phenomena out of their contemporaneous setting and_ reading them with a retrospective eye." 79
The decision in The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company In._
corporated v. Ray-O-Vac Company 80 is significant chiefly in that by
a five to four decision; certain claims of the Anthony Patent No.
2,198,423 for a leak proof fl.ash light dry cell were held valid and
infringed. The majority opinion found that the commercial acceptance
of the invention indicated the presence of "invention." The minority of
the judges who joined in the dissenting opinion were not impressed by
this showing and contended that the patent did not disclose an "invention."
The public interest in patent litigation has been advanced by the
Supreme Court as the motivating factor in the following. cases, in all
of which the patents in suit were held invalid.
In United Carbon, Company v. Binney and Sm#h Company 81 the
Court restated the rule announced in General Electric Company v.
Wabash Appliance Corporation 82 regarding the necessity for the accurate and precise compliance with the statutory requirement regarding
particularity and distinctness of the matter claimed. The patent in
suit purported to cover so-called "dustless" carbon black as a new
product. After finding that the claims in suit were "but inaccurate
suggestions of the function of the product," the Court summarized the
need for a strict compliance with the statutory requirement regarding
th<: particularity and distinctness required in patent claims, and stated:
"The statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness in
claims is met only when they clearly distinguish what is claimed
from what went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what
is foreclosed from future enterprise. A zone of uncertainty which
enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of inId. at 6o-63.
.
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fringement claims would discourage invention only a little less
than unequivocal foreclosure of the field. Moreover, the claims
must be reasonably clear-cut to enable courts to determine whether
novelty and invention are genuine." 88
The Court also holds that:
"An invention must be capable of accurate definition, and it must
be accurately defined to be patentable." 84
In Milcor Steel Company v. George A. Fuller Company 85 the
patent in suit was invalidated because a disclaimer had been filed which
included in the revised claim a combination, an element of which
was not present in the original claim. Although this addition of the
element to the claim narrowed the claim of the original patent, the
Court held that the narrowing disclaimer invalidated the patent since
the disclaimer changed the entire combination. The Court, in the
opinion of Justice Black, said:
"To permit such substantial alterations under the disclaimer
statute which, where applicable, gives e:ffect to the revised claims
from the date of the original issue without any consideration by
the patent office would be contrary to the policy of the patent laws.·
In the words of Mr. Justice Bradley, it would permit 'a ma.n ...
by merely filing a paper drawn up by his solicitor, [to] make himself a new patent.' [ Citing authorities] .... It would also retroactively create possibilities of innocent infringement where no one
would reasonably have suspected them to exist." 86
In Schriber-Schroth Company v. Cleveland Trust Company 81 the
Court restricted the application of the doctrine of equivalents in a case
in which the allowed claim had been amended, the Court stating the
rule that:
"The patentee may not, by resort to the doctrine of equivalents,
give to an allowed claim a scope which it might have had without
the amendments, the cancellation of which amounts to a disclaimer. . . . [ Citing cases]. The injurious consequences to the
public and to the inventors and patent applicants if patentees were
thus permitted to revise cancelled or rejected claims and restore
them to their patents are manifest. . . . [ Citing authority] .
'~True, the rule is most frequently invoked when the original
88
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and cancelled claim is broader than that allowed, but the rule and
the reason for it are the same if the cancelled or rejected claim be
narrower .... [Citing authority]." 88

-IV
CONCLUSION

The "modern" law of patents, as enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court rests upon the earlier decisions which reflect the public
apprehension of those times that the patent system, in granting a
"monopoly" to an inventor, might change the national economy from
one based on "Free Enterprise" to one based on "Restrictive Privilege." Invention, rewarded under the patent system by the grant of a
"monopoly," was regarded with both public and judicial suspicion
chiefly because it was to be encouraged by the grant of a "monopoly."
Daniel Webster understood that the public interest was best served
by encouraging invention but he appreciated the strength of the public
fear of "monopolies." In arguing for the validity of the Goodyear
patent for the vulcanization of rubber, he sought to allay that fear
by his ~sertion that:
"The right of an inventor to his invention is no monopoly. It is
no monopoly in any other sense than as a man's own house is a
monopoly."

In recent decisions in patent cases, there is noted a decided trend to
return to the earlier view that a patent, because it grants a monopoly,
is a "privilege" and not "property." This is reflected in the attempts
to establish a judicial "standard of invention" in enforcing patents
which is more strict than the "standard of invention" applied by the
Patent Office in granting the patents; in the strict construction of the
patent against the patentee; and the refusing of relief to a patentee
against "contributory" infringement.
Patents, whether considered as granting a "privilege" or as being
"property" have in some instances been abused. Some of these instances of abuse have been before the courts and existing remedies
have been found under the anti-trust laws and the general maxims of
equity. The existing remedies have been applied to control the more
:flagrant abuses of the patent laws without changing the basic concepts
of our patent system.
There are needed reforms in the administration of the patent law,
88
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particularly in its procedural aspects in the Patent Office. To a very
considerable extent these reforms can be carri~d out by the Commissioner of Patents under his existing authority.
It is to be expected that the abuses which have been brought to
light by the various investigations of the patent system and as highlighted in various prosecutions under the anti-trust laws will lead to
continuing demands for legislative enactments to reform the patent
system. The practitioner of patent law and the student interested in
the future of the patent law will therefore do well to keep fully informed on the new bills and legislative proposals which may, under
the guise of correcting an apparent defect in the patent system, have a
more far reaching effect-possibly the complete destruction of the
patent system as we have known it.
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court raise the question
clearly as to whether or not our patent system is functioning properly
when such a large percentage of the patents involved are found to be
invalid. If the patent system is to serve its constitutional purpose, the
patentee should be accorded some "reward" more certain than the
dubious and expensive honor of having been an unsuccessful suitor
in the United States Supreme Court.
The administration of the patent laws poses this problem. If the
patent office· in issuing patents, applies the higher "standard of invention" applied by the courts, the result will be to cut down the total
number of patents issued. If, however, the present or a lowered
"standard of invention" is applied in the patent office the mortality
rate of such patents, when litigated will be so high that inventors will
no longer be lured into making disclosures to the patent office by the
illusionary hope of an unenforceable "reward." The broad public
policy underlying the constitutional provision for establishing the patent
system has for its purpose the securing of the publication of inventions
and scientific discoveries. This public purpose is defeated whenever
publication is curtailed or delayed.
Some system must and will be evolved for protecting the public
interest and at the same time "rewarding'' inventors to assure prompt
publication of their inventions and scientific discoveries - unless
this is done, we will revert in our industrial economy to the old practice of restrictive "Trade Secrets." It is doubtful if such a development would serve the public interest with as little risk as does a properly functioning patent system.
A highly developed patent system has been an integral part of the
national economies of the United States, Great Britain and Germany.
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The great advances in science and the useful arts made by these nations
must be attributed in a large part to the rapid dissemination of inventions and scientific discoveries made possible because of their patent
laws.
·
Under our patent system, the public has been the recipient of extensive benefits because of the inventions and discoveries patented
thereunder. Reforms in such a system are needed if it is to keep pace
with technological advan~es. The court decisions have pointed out
certain of the needed reforms. Other needed reforms are under consideration. The public is actively concerned with the problems. These
are hopeful indications that future remedial legislation will preserve
those portions of our patent system which have been found desirable
while correcting those portions which have not functioned properly in
the public interest.
The constitutional purpose of the patent law is clear. All reformers, students, and active practitioners will do well to keep this clear
purpose in mind--our patent system, if it is to survive must "promote
the progress of science and the useful arts." _

